Abstract. Liskov, Rivest and Wagner formalized the tweakable blockcipher (TBC) primitive at CRYPTO'02. The typical recipe for instantiating a TBC is to start with a blockcipher, and then build up a construction that admits a tweak. Almost all such constructions enjoy provable security only to the birthday bound, and the one that does achieve security beyond the birthday bound (due to Minematsu) severely restricts the tweak size and requires per-invocation blockcipher rekeying. This paper gives the first TBC construction that simultaneously allows for arbitrarily "wide" tweaks, does not rekey, and delivers provable security beyond the birthday bound. Our construction is built from a blockcipher and an -AXU2 hash function. As an application of the TBC primitive, LRW suggest the TBC-MAC construction (similar to CBC-MAC but chaining through the tweak), but leave open the question of its security. We close this question, both for TBC-MAC as a PRF and a MAC. Along the way, we find a nonce-based variant of TBC-MAC that has a tight reduction to the security of the underlying TBC, and also displays graceful security degradation when nonces are misused. This result is interesting on its own, but it also serves as an application of our new TBC construction, ultimately giving a variable input-length PRF with beyond birthday-bound security.
Introduction
A blockcipher E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is typically viewed as a family of permutations E K over {0, 1} n , where the index into the family is the key K ∈ {0, 1} k . A tweakable blockcipher (TBC) extends this viewpoint by adding a second "dimension" to the function family, called a tweak. In particular, a TBC E : {0, 1} k × T × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a family of permutations indexed by a pair (K, T ) ∈ {0, 1} k × T . There is, however, a semantic asymmetry between the key and the tweak: the key is secret and gives rise to security, while the tweak may be public and gives rise to variability.
Liskov, Rivest and Wagner [21] formalized the TBC primitive. Their thesis was that primitives with inherent variability are a more natural starting point for building modes of operation, whereas classical constructions would use a blockcipher (deterministic once the key is fixed) and induce variability by using a per-message IV or nonce. Subsequent papers have delivered tweakable enciphering schemes (e.g. [14-16, 32, 8] and others), message authentication codes (e.g. [28] ), and authenticated encryption (e.g. [27, 28, 20] ) modes of operation. The Skein [30] hash function has a TBC at its core. TBC-based constructions have found widespread practical application for full-disk encryption.
BUILDING TBCS. There are few dedicated TBC designs: the Hasty Pudding [29] and Mercy [10] ciphers natively admit tweaks. The more common approach is to start from a blockcipher and build up a TBC, incorporating support for a tweak without (one hopes) sacrificing whatever security the original blockcipher offered. The original LRW paper itself gave two constructions, which we call LRW1 and LRW2. The former construction is LRW1[E] K (T, X) = E K (T ⊕ E K (X)) and it is a secure tweakable-PRP 1 if the underlying n-bit blockcipher E is a secure PRP, although there is a birthday-type loss in the reduction. (That is, the security bound becomes vacuous around 2 n/2 queries.) In addition to birthday-bound security, the tweakspace is limited to T ⊆ {0, 1} n . The second LRW construction LRW2[H, E] h,K (T, X) = h(T ) ⊕ E K (X ⊕ h(T )) avoids this length restriction by hashing the tweak. LRW prove that this is a tweakable strong-PRP when E is a secure strong-PRP and h is a random element of an -almost 2-xor-universal ( -AXU 2 ) hash function family H. But here, too, one finds only birthday-bound security. Variations on the LRW constructions, for example Rogaway's XE and XEX constructions [28] , similarly offer provable security only to the birthday bound.
Tweakable blockciphers with beyond birthday-bound (BBB) security may be of particular interest for applications such as large-scale data-at-rest protection, where key management and negotiation issues seem likely to drive up the amount of data protected by a single key. Also, when legacy restrictions require the use of Triple-DES (where n = 64), delivering BBB security has obvious benefits. We also note that OCB mode [28] would deliver BBB authenticated-encryption security if constructed over a BBB tweakable blockcipher; other TBC-based constructions with (tight) security reductions to the security of the underlying TBC would similarly benefit.
Nonetheless, constructions of TBCs with BBB security are rare. One due to Minematsu [24] achieves BBB security, but only admits short tweaks (e.g. T = {0, 1}
n−m for m ≥ n/2). It requires two blockcipher calls per TBC invocation, and suffers an additional performance penalty by rescheduling one blockcipher key whenever the tweak changes. This last point also violates a TBC design goal, that changing a tweak should be more efficient than changing a key.
A NEW CONSTRUCTION WITH BBB SECURITY: CLRW2. Our main technical result is the first TBC construction that has tweakable strong-PRP security beyond the birthday bound, admits essentially arbitrary tweaks, and does not require per-invocation rekeying of any of the underlying objects.We call this the Chained LRW2 (CLRW2) construction, since it can be written as LRW2[H, E] h2,K2 (T, LRW2[H, E] h1,K1 (T, X)); see Figure 1 .
The bulk of the paper is dedicated to showing that when E is a secure strong-PRP and H is an -AXU 2 hash function family with = 2 −n , the CLRW2 TBC is a tweakable strong-PRP with security against adaptive attackers making O(2 2n/3 ) queries. Figure 2 gives a graphical comparison of our security bound and the birthday bound. We also consider some variations of CLRW2, for example omitting internal xors, or keying the two blockciphers with the same key.
Note that there are many efficient constructions of -AXU 2 families with ≈ 2 −n and, except perhaps for very long tweaks, the running time of CLRW2 is likely to be dominated by the two blockcipher calls. ANALYZING THE TBC-MAC CONSTRUCTION AND VARIANTS. In addition to formalizing the TBC primitive, LRW suggested TBC-based constructions for (authenticated) encryption, hashing and message authentication. The last of these has yet to receive formal analysis, so we consider it. The basic TBC-MAC construction operates as follows. Fix k, n > 0 and let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a tweakable blockcipher. Fix T 0 ∈ {0, 1} n . Then for any key K ∈ {0, 1} k and a plaintext M = M 1 , . . . , M b consisting of n-bit blocks, define TBCMAC[ E] K (M ) = T b where T i ← E K (T i−1 , M i ) for all i ∈ [1..b] . This is the TBC-MAC (over E) of the input M .
It is intuitive to think of TBC-MAC as analogous to CBC-MAC. Indeed, if E K (T, X) = E K (T ⊕ X) then we have the CBC-MAC construction. But perhaps by abstracting away the details of E one can achieve better security than that offered by CBC-MAC? This seems a reasonable expectation, since an attacker can directly influence the input to the blockcipher E in CBC-MAC via the exclusive-or operation, but no such influence is guaranteed when the chaining value (the tweak) is separated from the plaintext input block. Moreover, it is easy to build TBCs with tweak inputs that are much larger than n bits (LRW already gave one way), and exploiting this may allow for simple twists on the basic TBC-MAC that give better security.
We first consider TBC-MAC as a variable-input-length pseudorandom function (VIL-PRF). We show that it is secure if the underlying TBC is a secure tweakable-PRP. Like CBC-MAC, however, TBC-MAC has only birthday-bound security. A small benefit is that this result is not restricted to prefix-free encoded inputs as it is for CBC-MAC. Actually, one can view TBC-MAC as an instance of the Merkle-Damgård iteration [23, 11] over a compression function with a dedicated key input. In this setting Bellare and Ristenpart [3] have already shown that various versions of Merkle-Damgård (plain, suffix-free encoded inputs, prefix-free encoded inputs) are PRFpreserving.
A more interesting result is found if the underlying TBC allows "wide" tweaks, i.e. tweaks that are wider than the blocksize. In this case, a simple nonce-based version of TBC-MAC (TBCMAC2) achieves much better PRF security bounds. In fact, if nonces are properly respected, the mode of operation imparts no loss over the security of the underlying TBC. Thus, TBCMAC2 instantiated with a beyond-birthday secure TBC yields a variable-input-length PRF with beyond-birthday security. What's more, the security bound degrades quadratically in the maximum number of times any nonce is repeated, providing more graceful behavior than most nonce-based constructions, which fail catastrophically when a nonce-repeat occurs. Such nonce misuse-resistance can be quite useful in practice.
Lastly, we show that TBC-MAC is unforgeable assuming only that the underlying TBC is likewise unforgeable. This holds only for prefix-free encoded inputs. In fact, this follows from the work of Maurer and Sjödin [22] , who give general results for the Merkle-Damgård iteration. When the prefix-free encoding restriction is lifted, we exhibit a TBC E that is unforgeable, yet TBC-MAC over E is easily forged.
UNFORGEABILITY PRESERVATION OF TBC CONSTRUCTIONS. A final, small contribution of this work is to address the question: What if one wants only to assume access to cryptographic primitives that are unforgeable (i.e. unpredictable), rather than pseudorandom? No previous work addresses the provable security of TBC constructions starting from blockciphers with this weaker security assumption. We begin this effort by considering the two TBC constructions from LRW. We show that LRW1 is not unforgeability preserving. That is, we build a blockcipher E that is unforgeable but for which is it easy to forge LRW1 [E] . (In fact, we use LRW1 against itself in this result!) Likewise for LRW2, we show that there is an -AXU 2 hash function family and an unforgeable blockcipher E such that LRW2[H, E] is easily forged. (Again, we use LRW1 again to construct the E we need.) For space reasons, these results appear in Appendix E. At this time, we do not know if CLRW2 remains unforgeable given only unforgeable underlying blockciphers. ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK. We have already mentioned the paper of Liskov et al. [21] as the starting point for our work. Goldenberg et al. [17] show how to build a TBC by directly tweaking the Luby-Rackoff construction. Using n-bit random functions, the resulting 2n-bit TBC has tweakable strong-PRP security to roughly 2 n queries, and can accommodate a tweak of length n using + 6 rounds.
Coron et al. [9] show that a three-round Feistel construction over an n-bit TBC with a wide tweak yields a 2n-bit TBC that has beyond birthday-bound security if the underlying TBC does. Our CLRW2 construction meets this requirement.
The PMAC1 construction by Rogaway [28] builds a (parallelizable) VIL-PRF from a TBC, achieving birthdaybound security. Recently, Yasuda [34] introduced the PMAC plus construction, which has O(2 2n/3 ) security like TBCMAC2 but is more efficient and parallelizable. PMAC plus could be viewed as a construction over a tweakable blockcipher (which might be called the "XXE" construction, following Rogaway's naming convention), but neither the construction nor the proof is cast this way. Separately, Yasuda [33] proves that Algorithm 6 from ISO 9797-1 and SUM-ECBC both have security against O(2 2n/3 ) queries. The WMAC construction of Black and Cochran [6] is a stateful hash-then-MAC construction that, like our TBCMAC2 construction, allows for graceful (quadratic) security degradation when nonces are repeated. There are various methods for using randomness to build VIL-PRFs with beyond birthday-bound security; for example MACRX [2] , RMAC [19] , randomized WMAC and enhanced hash-then-MAC [25] We note that real-world protocols such as TLS [31] employ nonce-based PRFs by using per-message sequence numbers. Nonce-based PRFs also have applications in secure memory; see Garay et al. [18] and references therein.
Bellare and Ristenpart [3] study unforgeability preservation of iterated Merkle-Damgård constructions in the dedicated-key compression-function setting. They show that, in general, these iterations do not preserve unforgeability; however, their counterexample does not apply to TBC-MAC because the compression function they construct is not a TBC.
Zhang et al.
[35] study so-called rate-1 MACs constructed from variations of the PGV [26, 7] blockcipherbased compression functions. They show that certain of these compression functions, for example f (T, X) = E K ⊕ T (X), iterate (through T ) to unforgeable MACs under the assumption that the underlying blockcipher is related-key unpredictable for specific related-key functions. In the case of our example, the related-key functions are {K → K ⊕ T | T ∈ {0, 1} |K| }. But in this example and others, assuming that the blockcipher is related-key unforgeable is equivalent to assuming that the compression function is an unforgeable TBC, and thus chaining through the tweak leads to TBC-MAC. Hence our results generalize some of those given by Zhang et al. [35] . We note that TBCs like E K ⊕ T (X) are inefficient choices for iteration through the tweak, since they require rescheduling the blockcipher key each round.
We mention in passing that the basic three-key enciphered CBC construction due to Dodis et al. [12] can, in large, part be viewed as an instance of TBC-MAC over the LRW1 TBC. (The IV is no longer a fixed value, but depends on the first input block.)
Preliminaries
NOTATION. When X is a set, we write x $ ← X to mean that an element (named x) is uniformly sampled from X . We overload the notation for probabilistic algorithms, writing x $ ← M to mean that algorithm M runs and outputs a value named x. When X and Y are strings, we write X Y for their concatenation. When X ∈ {0, 1} * we write |X| for its length and, if 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |X| we write X[i..j] for the substring running from its i th to j th characters, or the empty string ε otherwise. For a string X of even length n, we define X L and X R to be X[1.. 
n is the set of all n-bit strings, ({0, 1} n ) r is the set of all nr-bit strings understood as r blocks of n-bits each, and ({0, 1} n ) + is the set of all strings that are a positive number of n-bit blocks in length. When X ∈ ({0, 1} n ) + , we write X 1 , . . . , X b n ← X to mean that X is parsed into b blocks of n-bits each. For strings X, Y ∈ ({0, 1} n ) + we define the predicate CommonPF i (X, Y ) to be true if and only if X and Y agree on their first i blocks of n-bits, i.e. X j = Y j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i where X j , Y j ∈ {0, 1} n . When X ⊆ ({0, 1} n ) + and M ∈ ({0, 1} n ) + , we also define Prefix X (M ) to be the function that returns the blockwise longest common prefix that M shares with strings in X . An adversary A is a probabilistic algorithm that takes zero or more oracles. We often use the notation A⇒x to denote the event (defined over some specified probability space) that some algorithm A outputs value x.
We make use of the code-based game-playing framework of Bellare and Rogaway [5] . When G is a game and A an adversary, we write Pr G A ⇒ y for the probability that the Finalize procedure of game G outputs y when executed with adversary A. The probability is over the coins of G and A. When the Finalize procedure is trivial, returning whatever A does, we omit the procedure from the game and write Pr A G ⇒ y for the probability that A outputs y when executed with game G. In games, all boolean flags are initialized to false and all arrays are initially undefined at every point.
FUNCTION FAMILIES AND (TWEAKABLE) BLOCKCIPHERS. Let K, D and R be sets, where at least K is nonempty. A mapping F : K × D → R can be thought of as a function family F = {F K } where for each K ∈ K we assign F K (·) = F (K, ·). We will use both representations of the family, as a two-argument mapping and as a set indexed by the first argument, choosing whichever is most convenient. We write Func(D, R) for the set of all mappings from D to R. We write Perm(n) to denote the set of all permutations (bijections) over {0, 1}
n . We can view each of these as function families with some understood ordering.
A blockcipher is a function family E : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n such that for all K ∈ K the mapping E K (·) ∈ Perm(n). We write BC(K, n) to mean the set of all such blockciphers, shortening to BC(k, n) when K = {0, 1} k .
A tweakable blockcipher (TBC) is a function family E : K × (T × {0, 1} n ) → {0, 1} n such that for every K ∈ K and T ∈ T ⊆ {0, 1} * the mapping E K (T, ·) is a permutation over {0, 1} n . The set T is called the tweakspace of the TBC, and the element T ∈ T is the tweak.
4
SECURITY NOTIONS. Let F : K × D → R be a function family, and let A be an adversary taking one oracle. Then we define Adv
to be the PRF advantage of A attacking F . Here, and throughout, the probability is over the random choices of the described experiment and those of the adversary. We define
to be the UF-CMA advantage (or "forging" advantage) of A. Here the event new-msg holds iff the string M was never asked by A to its oracle. Let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher, and let E : {0,
to be (respectively) the PRP, strong PRP, tweakable-PRP, and tweakable strong-PRP advantages of A, an adversary taking the indicated number of oracles. These probabilities are over the random coins of A and the random choices of K, π, and Π, as appropriate.
RESOURSES AND CONVENTIONS. We consider the following adversarial resources: the running time t, the number of oracle queries asked q, and the total length of these queries µ. For the PRP and strong PRP notions, we suppress µ since it is implicitly computable from q and the blocksize. In the UF-CMA advantage, µ includes the length of the output forgery attempt (M, τ ). It will often be the case that queries (and forgery attempts) are strings in ({0, 1} n ) + for some blocksize n > 0, and here it will be convenient to speak of the total number of blocks σ = µ/n. The running time of an adversary is relative to some (implicit) fixed underlying model of computation. Running times will always be given with respect to some security experiment, and we define the running time to include the time to execute the entire experiment. We assume that adversaries do not make pointless queries: they do not repeat queries, nor do they ask queries that are outside of the domain of oracles they may access.
3 Tweakable SPRP-security of CLRW2
The centerpiece of this work is a TBC construction that provides BBB security, admits a large tweakspace, and does not require rekeying of any underlying object. Given a blockcipher E : {0, 1} k ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is blockcipher, and a hash function family H :
The following theorem is our main technical result.
Theorem 1. Fix k, n > 0 and let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher. Fix a non-empty set K H , and let D ⊆ {0, 1}
* . Let H : K H × D → {0, 1} n be an -AXU 2 function family. Let E = E[H, E] be the CLRW2 construction, defined above. Let A be an adversary asking a total ofueries to its oracles, running in time t. Let = max{ , 1/(2 n − 2q)}. Then there exists an adversary B using the same resources, such that This bound deserves some interpretation. Consider = 2 −n (since there are efficient constructions meeting this), and assume q ≤ 2 n−2 . Thenˆ ≤ 1/2 n−1 ≈ 2 −n for interesting values of n. Now the additive term in the bound is at most p when q ≤ (p/(p + 6)) 1/3ˆ −2/3 , so for any small constant p we have q = O(2 2n/3 ). Thus when Adv sprp E (B) is sufficiently small, CLRW2 is secure as a tweakable-SPRP up to about 2 2n/3 queries. 2 Figure 2 gives a graphical comparison of our bound and the standard birthday bound.
PROOF OVERVIEW. The proof of Theorem 1 is quite long and involved, so we'll start by giving a high-level overview of it. Proofs demonstrating birthday-bound security for TBC constructions typically "give up" if the adversary can cause a collision at a blockcipher input. In constructions like LRW1 and LRW2, the TBC output is no longer random, even when the blockcipher has been replaced by a random permutation. We overcome this problem by using two rounds of LRW2, and showing that it takes two independent collisions on the same query to force non-random CLRW2 outputs.
The chief difficulty is ensuring that the second LRW2 round can withstand a collision so long as there was not also one on the first round. To this end, we argue that given a collision-free first round, the resulting distribution of CLRW2 output values -including those which require a second-round collision to obtain -is extremely close to that of an ideal TBC.
The bulk of the proof is a sequence of games bounding the success probability of an adversary in the informationtheoretic setting, where the blockciphers have been replaced by random permutations. The first three games address first-round collisions, and show that the distribution of CLRW2 outputs is consistent with that of an ideal cipher unless there is simultaneous a second-round collision. Our next three games address the case in which there is no first-round collision. By swapping the order in which dependent random variables are assigned values, we can choose the output early on in the game, and gain insight into the distribution by which it is governed. This distribution is shown to be very close to the ideal one. The final two games are used to derive an upper bound for the probability that the adversary can set a "bad flag", which would force the game to exhibit non-ideal behavior. In the end, we are able to assume that the adversary is non-adaptive by giving it explicit control over oracle return values. At that point, the -AXU 2 property can be applied.
Proof. For notational simplicity, we write h 1 for H h1 , and h 2 for H h2 ; this should cause no confusion. The majority of the proof will consider the construction E with E K1 and E K2 replaced with random permutations π 1 and π 2 , which we write as E h1,h2,πi,π2 . At the end we can make a standard move to lift to the fully complexity theoretic setting.
Let A be an adversary makingueries. If the i th query is to the left (encryption) oracle, we denote the query with (T i , X i ) and the response with Y i ; if the query is to the right (decryption) oracle, the roles of X i and Y i are 2 We note that Adv sprp E (B) will be at least t/2 k ≈ q/2 k by exhaustive key search so, q = 2 2n/3 requires k > 2n/3, which is met by AES (k = n = 128) and DES (k = 56, n = 64).
reversed. We denote by Y i the set of permissible (tweak-respecting) return values for an encryption oracle query, and similarly, X i is the set of permissible return values for a decryption oracle query. That is,
Given a set S ⊆ {0, 1} n and a string x ∈ {0, 1} n we define S ⊕ x = {s ⊕ x : s ∈ S}. The permutations π 1 and π 2 are constructed lazily, while h 1 and h 2 are already defined. Initially, boolean variables have the value false, integers are zero, and all other variable types are undefined (equal to ⊥). Game G1 (refer to Appendix A to see the games used in this proof) simulates E exactly by lazily sampling values for π 1 and π 2 . Note that there is a certain symmetry between the encryption and decryption oracles. This symmetry arises from the fact that E is the dual of E −1 , in the sense that E
The bulk of this proof concerns showing that a sequence of games are identical, or are identical until a specified event occurs (a boolean variable is set to true). When arguing that transitions between games are correct in this sense, we will exploit the above symmetry by limiting our discussion to changes in the encryption oracle, and hence to queries made to that oracle; the arguments used to justify the corresponding changes in the decryption oracle are practically identical. Therefore fix some value i ∈ [1..q], and assume the i th query is to the encryption oracle.
In Game G2, we change what happens when there is a collision at the first block cipher: we sample Y i from the ideal distribution, but raise a bad flag if we also encounter a collision at the input of second block cipher (bad 1 ) or if Y i is already in the defined range (bad 2 ). See Figure 6 . Game G3 is identical to Game G2, except Y i is not reassigned after a bad flag is set. Hence Pr
Next we modify the section of code in Game G3 that is executed when no collision occurs at π 1 ; i.e., when
Note that the random variables Z and Y i are dependent. In Game G3, Z is chosen before Y i , but as long as the joint distribution as preserved we may reverse this order. The resulting game will be equivalent to Game G3. As always, the decryption oracle will be modified in a similar manner.
To describe the correct distribution for Y i , partition {0, 1} n into four sets, S 1 , S 2 , S 3 and S 4 . These sets are defined with respect to an oracle query (T i , X i ) such that no collision occurs at π 1 ; that is, such that
(When referring to Dom(·) outside of pseudocode, we refer to the set of points at which the function is defined at the instant the adversary makes its i th oracle call [and similarly for Rng(·)]; the game currently being used to define the oracle should be clear from context). For y ∈ {0, 1} n , we say y is permissible when y ∈ Y i , and y is possible when Pr [ Y i = y ] > 0, given our assumption that X i ⊕ h 1 (T i ) ∈ Dom(π 1 ) and the oracles' execution histories for the first i − 1 queries. Let S 4 be the set of all non-permissible values. Note that if y is not permissible (it has been returned on a query that used tweak T i ), then y is not possible (since E(T i , ·) is a permutation and queries are distinct); hence S 4 is a subset of the impossible values. Let S 3 be the set of impossible values that are permissible.
We now subdivide the set of possible values based on the conditional branch on Line 317 in Game G3. Some values for Y i will only be returned if the choice of Z causes a collision at π 2 , while others can only be assigned in the absence of such a collision; the former will be S 2 , the latter S 1 . More formally, one can see that y is not possible if and only if y ⊕ h 2 (T i ) ∈ Rng(π 2 ) and π
2 )}, and let S 2 be the set of all other possible values.
In summary,
When these sets are used in pseudocode, it is understood that they are defined at the time the oracle call is made; although Rng(π 1 ) (for example) may change as code executes, S 2 does not change until the next query. When referred to by a decryption oracle, the definitions for these sets are the same up to the previously mentioned duality.
We will now compute the probability that Y i will be in each of these sets (again, under the assumption that there is no collision at the first block cipher; i.e, that
This value is in Rng(π 1 ) by definition of S 2 , and so this event happens with probability 1/N . Hence, otherwise. However, we have shown that if there is no collision at π 1 on the i th query, then Y i is distributed as
See Figure 3 . Now, let V $ ← ξ(p) denote that the random variable V is equal to one with probability p and is zero otherwise. In Game G4 (see Figure 7) , we decide whether to sample Y i from S 1 or from S 2 based on an appropriately weighted coin flip. It follows that Z is uniformly distributed from Rng(π 1 ); letting
and S = Rng(π 1 ) \ S , we have
and similarly for z ∈ S . Therefore π 1 (L i ) is assigned a uniformly random value from Rng(π 1 ), as desired. Games G3 and G4 are therefore equivalent. Figure 3 ). Because total probability is always one, ∆ 1 + ∆ 2 = ∆ 3 . In Game G5, we reverse the order in which Y i and V i are sampled. To show that V i follows the same distribution in Games G4 and G5, we denote the corresponding random variables used by these two games as V G4 and V G5 , respectively. Let Y be the value initially assigned to Y i in Game G5 (Line 612). Note that Pr [ Y ∈ S 3 ] = ∆ 3 . We have:
The final value for Y i is in S 2 (S 1 ) if and only if V G5 = 1 (V G5 = 0), in which case it is distributed uniformly among the values of this set. Hence the final value of (Y i , V i ) has the same distribution in Games G4 and G5, and so the two games are equivalent. Game G6 is identical to Game G5 until bad 3 is set. Therefore Pr
At this point, Y i is always sampled from Y i , and once assigned, its value is never changed. Consequently, we can move this assignment to outside the if block. The resulting game, Game G7, is shown in Figure 7 . Game G7 behaves exactly as an ideal TBC, and in particular, Pr
We now give the adversary control over what value is assigned to Y i (or X i , in the case of decryption queries) in Game G8, but insist that it be in Y i or X i , as appropriate. We also simplify program flow by removing the nowunnecessary variable V i . Because the adversary can compute Y i and X i , he may simulate the oracles of Game G7 if desired; hence, he can set the bad flags in Game G8 with probability at least as high as any adversary can set the corresponding flags in Game G7. The oracle's outputs are now deterministic, and may be (trivially) computed by the adversary in advance. Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that the adversary is non-adaptive.
For the rest of this proof, all probabilities will be with respect to the experiment A G8 (unless the experiment is explicitly stated).
Let Q be the event that for there exist i, j, and k (with j, k = i) such that
That is, Q indicates the i th query is responsible for collisions at both π 1 and π 2 . Our strategy is to show that Q is extremely unlikely, since it requires two independent collisions involving a single query. Barring such a query, we can show that the probability of a bad flag being set is very small.
By definition of Q and the -AXU 2 property of H,
Define β j = max A Pr A G8 : bad j | ¬Q and β j (i) = max A Pr A G8 : bad j on query i | ¬Q . We consider the event in the latter definition to "trigger" even if it has also triggered on an earlier query. (This definition assumes q is not so large that Pr [ ¬Q ] = 0, but since our bound becomes vacuous before this threshold, this is not an issue.) When bounding β j (i), we will assume the i th query is made to the encryption oracle; as before, the other case is symmetric.
Because bad 2 can only be set if the conditions for Q are met, we immediately have that
Note that bad 1 is set on query i if and only if there exist j, k < i such that
where we remind the reader that L i = X i ⊕ h 1 (T i ). Our goal now is to bound
where for brevity we introduce
Because queries are unique and
We now wish to bound Pr [
(the other factor in our bound for β 1 (i)), so assume that there is some j < i such that L i = L j and that ¬Q.
Because queries must respect per-tweak permutivity, T i = T k ; hence by the -AXU 2 property of H, in this case β 1 (i) ≤ .
On the other hand, if L i = L k , we will trace the execution history of the game backwards to when the values eventually assigned to π 1 (
was defined. Fortunately, our assumption that the conditions for Q are not met saves us from having to backtrack far. Let = min {m :
) is sampled, through Z, from a set of size at least 2 n − 2q. In the first of these two cases, let r = k ; in the second, let r = . After query r completes, the value which will be assigned to π 1 (L k ) is deterministic.
Suppose without loss of generality that i > r. Then
is assigned the unique value that makes the former equation true; this happens with probability at most 1/(2 n − 2q).
If the encryption oracle query (T i , X i , Y i ) would cause bad 3 to be set, then one can see by inspection that the decryption oracle query (T i , Y i , X i ) would set bad 1 . Therefore the upper bound we derived for β 1 (i) may also be used for β 3 (i), and as a consequence, the upper bound for β 1 also bounds β 3 .
By the fundamental lemma of game playing,
Thus by a standard argument, there exists a B such that
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This completes the proof.
ATTACKS ON SIMPLER VARIANTS. Having seen our construction, one wonder if simpler variants work. For example, consider CLRW2 without the first H h2 (T ) XOR operation, leaving
This variation permits birthday-bound attack. Namely, an adversary could submit queries in pairs, (T i , X ) and (T i , X ), where X and X are fixed, and a new random tweak is used for each pair. By remembering the values E(T i , X ) ⊕ E(T i , X ), which are independent of H h2 , it could detect collisions in H h1 , say by using a hash table. That is, if
The converse is false, but false positives could be weeded out by testing a small number of X-values. Such an adversary would gain advantage close to one. Similar variations on E permit analogous attacks, though we believe (but do not prove) that omitting the second H h1 (T ) XOR operation yields a construction secure against adversaries constrained to chosen-plaintext attacks. One might also wish to try setting K 2 = K 1 . While we know of no attacks here, modifying our proof to accomodate this change would be non-trivial. In particular, bounding β 1 required us to trace back through a game's execution history to determine when π 1 became defined at particular points; this task would be messier and more difficult to verify if π 2 = π 1 . Still, this may merit future investigation.
PRF-security of TBC-MAC
THE TBC-MAC FUNCTION FAMILY. Fix k, n > 0 and let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a tweakable blockcipher. We define the TBC-MAC function family
To extend the domain to {0, 1} * , one could introduce an explicit, unambiguous padding rule mapping {0, 1}
where r is the smallest integer needed to reach a block boundary. But for simplicity we assume that all strings input to TBCMAC[ E] are block-aligned. We extend this assumption by writing TBCMAC pf for the TBC-MAC construction restricted to prefix-free encoded, block-aligned inputs.
BUILDING FROM A "NARROW" TWEAKSIZE TBC. Our first result in this section is a natural one. We prove that TBC-MAC is a secure PRF if the underlying TBC E, with n-bit tweaks and blocksize, is secure as a tweakable-PRP. One might hope that the security bound for TBCMAC[ E] is better than for CBC-MAC over an n-bit blockcipher, since the former is intuitively a "stronger" object than the latter. This is not the case. This is because the IV is fixed; thus an adversary can ask a series of distinct one-block messages and wait for a collision. Considering the information-theoretic setting, the fixed IV effectively reduces the ideal cipher to a random permutation in the first round, and so the standard PRP-PRF distinguishing attack forces us to accept birthday-bound security. The following theorem closely follows the code-based game-playing proof of CBC-MAC due to Bellare and Rogaway [5] . We note that a tighter bound could be achieved (with more work) following the techniques of Bellare et al. [4] . The proof appears in Appendix B .
n be a tweakable blockcipher. Let A be an adversary running in time t, askingueries, each of length at most blocks of n-bits. Then
for an adversary B that runs in time t = t + O( q) and asks at most q =ueries.
BUILDING FROM A "WIDE" TWEAKSIZE TBC. The LRW2 and CLRW2 constructions each give TBC that can handle tweaks that are potentially much larger than the blocksize. So we now consider the security of a nonce-based version of TBC-MAC based upon such a TBC. In particular, fix k, n, b > 0 and let
n be a tweakable blockcipher with tweaksize n + b + 1 bits and blocksize n bits. For an -block message M 1 , . . . , M where > 1, nonce N ∈ {0, 1} b , and a fixed
We say that a PRF-adversary A is nonce-respecting (for TBCMAC2) if it never repeats a nonce. The multiplicity α of a nonce N is the number of times it is used in an attack, e.g. α = 1 for every nonce if the attack is nonce-respecting. 
n be a tweakable blockcipher. Let TBCMAC2[ E] be as described above. Let A be an adversary that runs in time t, asksueries for the form (N, M ) where the length of M is at most blocks. Assume that there are r distinct values of N among these queries, and let α 1 , . . . , α r denote the multiplicities of these. Then
where B runs in time t = t + O(q ) and asks at most q =ueries. Specifically, if A is nonce-respecting, Adv
Proof. The second claim follows immediately from the first, since α i = 1 for all i if A is nonce-respecting. So we prove the first claim. We omit proof of the standard switch from the complexity-theoretic to the information-theoretic setting, wherein adversary B simulates the PRF experiment for TBCMAC2 over E K or Π, depending upon its own oracle. The remainder of the proof is the core technical piece, which proceeds by a sequence of code-based games.
For ease of notation, we write TBCMAC2[Π] instead of TBCMAC2[BC(n+b+1, n)] Π with the understanding that Π is a uniform element from BC(n+b+1, n). Also, in the psuedocode we use Dom(Π(T, ·)) to denote the set of domain points under the (lazily sampled) random permutation Π(T, ·) that have been assigned a corresponding range value. Likewise, the set Rng(Π(T, ·)) denotes the set of stings in {0, 1}
n that have not yet been associated to any domain point under Π(T, ·). Games are shown in Figure 4 .
Game G0 faithfully simulates TBCMAC2[Π], using lazy sampling to establish the random Π. Game G1 does likewise, but always returns a uniform random string. Letting bad = bad 1 ∨ bad 2 , we see that these games are identical-until-bad, so Pr A G0 ⇒ 1 − Pr A G1 ⇒ 1 ≤ Pr A G1 sets bad . Since G1 returns a random string no matter what the value of bad, we drop unneccessary instructions and move to game G2 with Pr A G1 sets bad = Pr A G2 sets bad ≤ Pr A G2 sets bad 1 + Pr A G2 sets bad 2 . It is easy to see that the first summand is at most (1/2 n+1 ) r i=1 (α i )(α i − 1) by a union bound. Game G3 is the same as G2 with the setting of bad 1 removed. Thus we have Pr A G1 sets bad ≤ (1/2 n+1 )(
The setting of bad 2 is more complicated to analyze, because the adversary controls M It only matters that the domain point has been previously assigned a value. Moreover, these values are never used in the for-loop (because N s = 1 N ). So the adversary could itself have selected up front the values T s bs to be returned and, also up front, picked the q pairs (N, M) that optimize the chance of bad 2 . So in G4 we no longer sample T s bs , and no longer return any value; we simply mark domain points as defined. Thus Pr A G3 sets bad 2 ≤ Pr A G4 sets bad 2 . Fix the optimal set of (N, M) for setting bad 2 in G4. Finally in game G5 we delay the setting of bad 2 until the end, exchange the procedure F for a for-loop over the fixed nonce-message pairs, and sample the entire ideal cipher Π at the beginning instead of using lazy sampling. We note that G5 sets bad 2 at least as often as does G4, since the latter only requires a tweak collision. Hence Pr A G4 sets bad 2 ≤ Pr [ G5 sets bad 2 ] .
Once Π is fixed, the order in which the
, are put through the for-loop does not matter, so we assume that they are ordered lexicographically by their first component. Thus we can think of the messages as being processed in groups "named" by their common nonce value. By assumption, there are r such groups with sizes α 1 , . . . , α r , respectively. Let Coll 1 , . . . , Coll r be the events that bad 2 is set by members of the corresponding groups. Then we have Pr [ G5 sets
Collecting up results we have
At this point we notice that if α 1 = · · · = α r = 1, then all terms on the right side are zero. Thus if the attack is nonce-respecting, then our reduction is as tight as possible. In general, every i ∈ [r] for which α i = 1 contributes zero to the right side. Assume that α i > 1 for some i ∈ [r]. The probability that Coll i is bounded as follows. Consider any two messages M, M that are associated to the same nonce. By Lemma 2 we know the probability that these collide is at most (2 ) 2 /2 n since each message is at most blocks long. By taking a union bound over all such pairs of messages we obtain
n and our proof is complete.
Unforgeability-Preservation of TBC-MAC
TBC-MAC preserves the unforgeability of its underlying TBC when the TBC-MAC inputs are prefix-free. Since, qualitatively, this amounts to a new application of an existing result by Maurer and Sjödin [22] , we defer our proof to Appendix D .
Theorem 4.
(TBCMAC pf preserves UF-CMA.) Fix k, n > 0, and let E : {0,
n be a TBC. Let A be an adversary for TBCMAC pf [ E] that runs in time t, asksueries, these totaling σ blocks of n-bits in length. Then there exist adversaries B and C such that
where B runs in time t B ≤ t, asks q B ≤ σ queries totalling σ B ≤ 2σ blocks; and where C runs in time t C = t, asks q C = σ queries totalling σ C = 2σ blocks.
However, if adversaries may mount an attack using non-prefix-free inputs, it is possible to forge TBC-MAC. 3 The following lemma says that there exists a TBC F ,shown in Figure 13 , that is unforgeable if some underlying TBC E is. Liskov et al. [21] provide a TBC E with the required signature.
2n be a tweakable blockcipher defined by
where the resources of adversaries A and B are the same.
Proof. F is a tweakable blockcipher because, given the tweak T and key K, one can invert
is a permutation for every tweak T . Now, let B be a forging adversary for E that runs as follows. Adversary B runs A, responding to A's queries by using its own oracle for E. When A outputs its forgery
If A's forgery is valid, it must be the case that
procedure F (N, M ):
procedure F (N, M): It must also be the case that A's final query (T * , X * ) be a new query. This implies that
is a new query as well, as we have only rearranged the forgery's n-bit blocks. Clearly, then, B successfully forges whenever A does. Furthermore, B makes the same number of queries as A does. Therefore, if A runs in time t makingueries totalling σ blocks, Adv
, where the resources of B are t = t, q =ueries, these totalling σ = σ blocks. This is due to the fact that each of A'sueries contain a 2n-bit tweak and a 2n-bit message (a total of 4n bits per query), and each of B'sueries contain a 3n-bit tweak and an n-bit message (also totalling 4n bits per query).
We now show that TBC-MAC instantiated with F admits efficient forging attacks if arbitrary inputs are allowed. UF-CMA preserving. ) Let E be a tweakable blockcipher and let F be as defined in Lemma 1. Then there exists an adversary A that asks q = 2 queries totalling σ = 12 blocks of n-bits such that Adv uf-cma TBCMAC [ F ] (A) = 1.
Theorem 5. (TBCMAC is not

Proof. Consider the adversary
, and then forges with X * = 0
The forgery is valid; we leave the confirmation of this fact to the interested reader. 
A Games for Theorem 1
This appendix contains the games used in the proof of Theorem 1.
GAME G1
100 Procedure E(T, X): Fig. 5 . Game G1 simulates E by using lazy sampling to define the random permutations.
GAMES G2 , G3
300 Procedure E(T, X):
400 Procedure E(T, X): Fig. 6 . Game G2 resamples invalid Yi values, and so behaves identically to Game G1. Game G3, which excludes boxed commands, behaves as like an ideal TBC for encryption queries that cause collisions at π1 (and decryption queries that cause collisions at π2). Game G4 behaves identically to Game G3, except that the order in which Z and Yi are sampled is reversed. This happens by assigning Yi a value based on a weighted coin toss (Vi). 601
// Vi = ⊥ here in Game G6, so neither 622 // branch of the following if block executes
// Vi = ⊥ here in Game G6, so neither 657 // branch of the following if block executes Fig. 7 . In Game G5, the order in which Vi and Yi are reversed. Game G6 behaves identically to Game G5 until bad3 is set (i.e., until Yi ∈ S3).
GAME G7
700 Procedure E(T, X): Fig. 8 . Game G7 is identical to Game G6, but simplifies some of the program flow.
GAME G8
800 Procedure E(T, X, Y ): Fig. 9 . Game G8 gives the advesary control over Yi values. Such an adversary can set bad flags at least as easily as adversaries for Game G7 can. Additionally, adversaries for Game G8 are, without loss of generality, non-adaptive.
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B Proof of Theorem 2
Games G0 , G1 procedure F (M ): Fig. 10 . Games for the proof of Theorem 2. We define T[ε] = 0 n . The set M is initially empty. Consider the case that the event forges occurs in G1. Then necessarily G1-line 29 executes (the game did not halt), so in fact Pr 1 [ forges ] = Pr 1 forges | Coll . In this case there exists an obvious E-forging adversary C (based on the code of game G1) that outputs ((T bq−1 , M q bq ), τ ) as its forgery. We claim that if event (forges | Coll) occurs in G1, then C successfully forges E. To see this, it suffices to show that C never asks (T bq−1 , M q bq ) to its E-oracle during its execution. Assume not, and consider the message blocks M q is a prefix of some previously queried message, which violates the prefixfree encoding of the messages. In the latter case, Coll must have occurred for some , which contradicts our assumption that Coll is true. Hence Pr 1 forges | Coll ≤ Adv uf-cma E (C). The adversary C perfectly simulates an oracle TBCMAC pf [ E] for A, making a single query for each block of a message queried by A. Thus C's resources are defined by t C = t, q C = σ, and σ C = 2σ which comes from the fact that C must query the tweak in addition to the message when simulating TBCMAC pf on each block of A's queries.
Thus it remains to bound Pr 1 [ Coll ] to finish our proof. For ∈ [1..σ − 1] let B be the adversary described in Figure 11 . Recall that if Coll is true, then exactly one of Coll is true, and for this there is some 0 ≤ p < such that T = T p . Let (T −1 , M ) be the query to E that gave rise to T . In this case, there is a 1/ chance that B correctly guesses the index p. If it does and (T −1 , M ) has not already been queried, then ((T −1 , M ), T p ) is a valid E-forgery. (Note that if (T −1 , M ) had already been queried, then Coll −1 would have held, contradicting our assumption that Coll holds.)
Thus F E is unforgeable if E is a secure tweakable-PRP. Now we leverage the results of Liskov et al. [21] to build a tweakable-PRP from a PRP. Specifically, let E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher, and
, where A makes Q queries to its oracle, and the resources of B are essentially those of A. This result, combined with Lemmas 3 and 4 gives the following.
n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher, and let LRW1[E] K (T, X) = E K (T ⊕ E K (X)) be defined as above. Let A run in time t, and askueries of total length σ blocks. Then there exists a B such that Adv uf-cma
where B runs in time t, asking q + 1 queries, these totalling σ blocks. 
and hence
which we must show is exactly Y * = Y 1 . Let U denote the output of the first round of E K calculated in the LRW1 construction, and let V denote the input to the second round of E K . Then we have both
finally giving
which completes the proof.
We note that if the two blockcipher calls in LRW1 were keyed with distinct keys, the proof is easily modified to cover this case, too. (We present the result with one key because this is the construction proposed by LRW.) BREAKING LRW2. Liskov et al. [21] give a second construction that yields a tweakable-PRP from a blockcipher and an -AXU 2 hash function. The LRW2 construction is as follows. Given a blockcipher E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and an -AXU 2 hash function family H, the construction LRW2[H, E] : (K × {0, 1} n ) × {0, 1} t × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is defined by LRW2[H, E] (h,K) (T, X) = h(T ) ⊕ E K (X ⊕ h(T )). We will show that there exists an -AXU 2 hash function family and an unforgeable blockcipher such that LRW2 admits an efficient forging attack that succeeds with high probablility. In particular, fix an -AXU 2 hash function family H mapping from t bits to n bits. Let H : K × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} 2n be the family defined by h (T ) = 0 n h(T ) for each h ∈ H. We immediately have the following lemma, given without proof.
Lemma 6. Fix t, n > 0 and let H : K × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} n be a family of -AXU 2 hash functions, and let H be defined as above. Then H is also -AXU 2 .
This will be our -AXU 2 hash function. For the blockcipher, we reuse the F 
). To aid in our analysis, we note that
and so 2n )) ). In order to prove the theorem statement, we must prove that ((T * , X * ), Y * ) is a valid forgery with probability 1 − . To this end, we first show that E K (T * , X * ) = Y * , and next that (T * , X * ) is a new query. To the first point, we note that where the probability is taken over the random choice of function h ∈ H. Thus we have We note that this counterexample is easily strengthened to the case that H is a collision-resistant hash function, rather than merely -AXU 2 . ] TBC construction, used in Theorem 7. Note that h (T ) = 0 n h(T ), but for compactness we do not draw the 0 n block or the exclusive-or (with 0 n ) operations.
